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WHY WOMEN MATTER: THE STORY OF MICROCREDIT
Charlotte E. Lott*
POOR WOMEN AS BORROWERS
Alice Amoateng of Ghana is on her second loan of around $100 to set up
and expand a clothing trading business.  She borrowed the money from a1
microfinance institution, Sinapi Aba Trust, because she had no access to credit
from the banking system.  This microfinance institution was able to lend her2
money by using a group lending system, in which groups of women are jointly
responsible for repayment of the loan.  The loans allowed her to make her3
business more profitable and to spend the extra income on her children’s
education and her family’s medical expenses.  In addition to the loan, she4
received training in business and leadership, and she was elected to public
office to represent her community.5
Irene Castro Quilca of Peru started with a loan of around $250 from
Confianza, a microfinance institution, to improve production on her small
potato farm.  She has continued to receive loans, and her children also have6
borrowed from Confianza.  Irene has become a spokesperson for the benefits7
of microcredit; once she traveled to Europe to speak at a symposium during
the United Nations International Year of Microcredit 2005.8
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In India, Suvarna moved from begging to selling stationery by using a
loan from SHARE, an Indian microfinance institution, to purchase inventory.9
The small loan provided Suvarna with an opportunity to improve her skills
and to increase her well-being.  SHARE’s lending follows the pattern of10
increasing loan size as the women repay each loan.  A first, second, and third11
loan is used to increase the skills and income of the woman borrower, while
a fourth and bigger loan may be used to improve her house.  Eligibility for a12
bigger loan along with a group lending structure encourage repayment of the
loan, and SHARE, whose clients are all women, claims to enjoy a repayment
rate of 100%.13
These three stories are from the project partners of Oikocredit, a socially
responsible investment organization that accepts funds from individuals,
churches, and organizations and lends those funds to microfinance institutions,
such as Sinapi Aba Trust, Confianza, and SHARE.  Microcredit is the14
provision of small loans to poor people to improve their productive
capabilities. Microcredit institutions are concerned with both the ability of
clients to repay loans with interest in order to sustain the enterprise and the
social impact of the program on the poor. Microfinance extends the
microcredit concept to the provision of other financial services, such as
monetary transactions, savings, insurance, and remittances, to poor people.
Though not originally designed that way, the primary borrowers and
beneficiaries of microcredit programs around the world are women, as
illustrated by the examples above. This review of microfinance literature
shows that the centrality of women has been a natural if unintentional result
of the central characteristics of microcredit programs and perhaps the leading
factor in their success.
WOMEN AT THE CENTER?
Microcredit is firmly associated with poor women who are the principal
borrowers and, therefore, the principal beneficiaries of the programs. The fact
that microcredit programs predominantly serve women raises this question:
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are microcredit programs different because the majority of their clients are
women, or is this merely an interesting facet of microcredit practices that
makes little real difference in terms of how the programs are administered or
in their impact?
Women have both reproductive and productive roles in the economy.  In15
their reproductive roles, women maintain the family through bearing and
rearing children. In their productive roles, women contribute to family income
through household production or work in the informal or formal sectors. Many
economic development programs have focused on women in their
reproductive roles, such as health programs to improve maternal and infant
health care; family planning programs to provide reproductive choices for
women; programs on household management to improve sanitation, nutrition,
and basic health care; and literacy and numeracy programs that focus on
women’s roles in educating children and improving the household.
Contrariwise, the microcredit movement focuses on women in their roles as
producers of income for the family. Credit, or the ability to borrow money for
expenditures in the present that is paid off with interest in the future, can be
used by women in their reproductive role to smooth consumption or in their
productive role to increase output. When families borrow to cover ongoing
costs or to purchase large cost items, this credit can smooth consumption by
spreading expenditures over a series of payments. This type of borrowing is
associated with a woman’s reproductive role in managing the family’s income
and expenditures. The stories of microcredit told by practitioners, however,
include examples of how microcredit works to improve the woman’s
productive capabilities: borrowers utilize their loans to purchase a sewing
machine to make and sell garments, to purchase a stove to sell prepared foods,
to purchase inventory to increase the size of a business, or to purchase small
animals to increase and sell agricultural output. The microcredit movement
differs from many development programs that are directed at female clients
since it emphasizes women’s productive rather than reproductive roles in the
economy.
While most writers on microcredit acknowledge that women are its
primary recipients, some simply ignore this feature of the programs. The
Economist, a news weekly aimed at business and political elites, published a
set of articles about microfinance focusing on why financial services have
been unavailable to the poor.  Rejecting the claim that the poor are not16
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suitable clients for these services, the articles instead examine why markets
have been hindered from providing the services.  Its reasons include:17
regulatory failure, high costs of providing services to the poor, and a lack of
information about the poor clients.  The Economist sees many positive signs18
in meeting these challenges through government improvement in financial
regulation, lower costs due to technology, and improved information through
credit ratings of both microfinance institutions and individual clients.  For19
The Economist, the key issue facing microfinance is how it can move into the
financial mainstream with more access to capital, which would increase the
ability to reach the poor with financial services.  Although the photos are20
almost entirely of women and the examples of lending involve women
borrowers, the articles clearly do not acknowledge the fact that the microcredit
movement is heavily focused on women clients.  Consequently, The21
Economist offers no analysis of whether it matters that microfinance
institutions focus on women borrowers.
On the other hand, a scholarly book on microcredit, The Economics of
Microfinance by Beatriz Armendáriz and Jonathan Morduch, discusses the
place of women in microcredit programs throughout its pages.  Additionally,22
the book includes a specific chapter on gender that looks at why women are
the primary recipients of microcredit and at the impact that women-funded
microcredit has on society. The authors identify two primary problems facing
organizations wishing to lend money to the poor: lack of information and lack
of collateral.  The first, a lack of information about lenders, leads to the23
problem of “adverse selection,” meaning that a bank cannot distinguish
between risky and credit-worthy borrowers and, therefore, does not lend at all
or charges high interest rates to all its clients.  The second, lack of collateral,24
leads to the problem of “moral hazard,” which theorizes that the borrower
does not have an incentive to work hard to pay back the loan.  The authors25
show how microcredit programs are designed to mitigate these problems
through group lending, progressive lending, frequent and public repayment,
and new ways of defining collateral. The authors illustrate why women
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borrowers are more likely to participate in these new types of lending
programs, why women borrowers have higher repayment rates for these new
types of loans, and why women borrowers have a larger impact on poor
families and on society.
HOW MICROCREDIT WORKS
The initial emphasis of microcredit was not loans for women but loans for
the poor. The poor lack access to financial services because they do not have
collateral; consequently, the lender cannot tell who would be an acceptable
risk—the cost of lending is very high since the size of the each loan is small
and the poor are often located in less accessible places. In lending to poor
clientele, pioneer microcredit institutions determined that their most
responsible borrowers were predominantly women borrowers because women
were willing to borrow and able to repay.
Women turn to microcredit programs for the same reason as men—lack
of access to capital through formal banking sources. Banks may be willing to
lend money to borrowers, even high-risk borrowers, as long as they can charge
higher interest rates to riskier borrowers to make up for higher defaults and
can enforce repayment through the use of collateral or the collection of
borrower property in the case of a loan default. These two problems—lack of
information about the credit worthiness of borrowers and lack of collateral to
enforce repayment of loans—mean that banks typically do not make loans to
poor people who lack credit ratings and collateral.
Microcredit programs solve these two problems with two primary
innovative institutional structures: peer group lending with public repayment
and progressive lending with early and frequent repayment. Peer group
lending solves the lack of information problem by having the group members
provide the needed information, and solves the repayment problem by using
peer pressure and public repayment. Progressive lending solves the lack of
information problem by starting with very small loans with quick repayment
and then developing a relationship with the borrower over time, and solves the
repayment problem with the incentive of larger loans in the future.
Peer-group lending works by lending to individuals within groups. The
loan process starts with some members of the group receiving loans and then
other members receiving loans only after repayment of the first set of loans.
In the classic group lending structure developed by the Grameen Bank, a
pioneer microfinance institution in Bangladesh, five women form a group,
with two receiving the initial loan, two more receiving the second loan, and
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the fifth member waiting for the third loan.  The group selects its own26
members and decides which women receive the first loans.  Along with a27
group loan, this method often includes group meetings for training,
encouragement, and repayment of the loan in a public setting. Since the group
knows more about the credit worthiness of its members and can monitor or
exclude people who might not repay, group lending solves the problem of
determining the credit worthiness of the borrowers.  Peer pressure from the28
group serves in the stead of collateral in encouraging repayment.  The group29
will spend time monitoring the loans of its members, and public repayment of
loans also contributes to social pressure to maintain one’s good name.  The30
group lending method results in lower costs because the bank deals with the
group instead of the individuals, which allows the lender to maintain fewer
separate accounts.  Group lending, however, faces problems as borrowers31
mature in their borrowing practices. Members with good credit ratings might
no longer wish to be constrained by the group to wait for a loan, to spend time
monitoring and mentoring members with trouble paying back loans, to attend
time-consuming meetings to undergo training, or to maintain group
cohesiveness.32
Progressive lending occurs when a subsequent loan is larger than the
initial loan and can occur in either group or individual lending. The incentive
for the borrower to repay is access to a larger loan. Since microcredit loans
start with minuscule amounts, access to larger loan amounts is a credible
incentive to repay the loan. There is always the threat of default on some
future loan; however, by then the lender and borrower have a more established
relationship and the borrower has seen the advantages of access to credit and
has developed the needed behavior to be able to repay the loan.  Along with33
progressive loans, frequency of repayment is a characteristic of microcredit.
Repayment on loans often begins well before any expected payoff from the
investment, so the borrower must either set aside the principal for early
repayments, or use current income for repayments. Early repayment
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requirements indicate that this type of loan acts in many ways as a substitute
for savings. The borrower has sufficient income to save for a larger purchase,
but the household has no mechanism to save. The loan allows for the larger
purchase, and it is repaid with current income of the household. In this
manner, the loan replaces a savings mechanism.34
WOMEN AND MICROCREDIT
The question of why women are at the center of this movement requires
an examination both of why women are the primary borrowers and of why
microcredit produces more benefits when directed at women. As researchers
have shown, poor women have become the primary clients of microcredit
institutions because the women were willing to become borrowers and
because the microcredit institutions began to target women as clients. Women,
as opposed to men, take advantage of microcredit lending for three reasons.
First, women have less access to borrowing through the formal banking sector
because the men in the family usually control the assets that could be used as
collateral for borrowing. Second, women are willing to abide by the
conditions of group borrowing, such as attendance at meetings and required
training. The women could be willing to agree to the conditions because they
have fewer alternatives in borrowing and because they find benefits in the
meetings and training. Third, women frequently work in the type of small-
scale production that could benefit from the small loans available through
microcredit. Women engage in small, home-based enterprises because they are
often excluded from employment in industries, or they need to remain at home
to manage the family.35
Microcredit institutions initially changed their focus to women clients
because women had a clear advantage in repayment rates.  Economic theory36
indicates that those with less access to capital have the highest rate of return
to investment. Since the women who are microcredit borrowers are excluded
from access to capital because they are poor and because they are women,
their high repayment rates might reflect the higher rates of return that accrue
to the investment of scarce capital. But this reason cannot be the only
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explanation for the high rate of repayment of women. Other explanations stem
from women’s lower mobility and higher risk averseness. Lower mobility of
women leads to easier monitoring and higher peer pressure, which are the
tools used in group lending to promote repayment. Higher peer pressure deters
fraud and misuse of funds. Risk averseness results in more conservative
expenditure of funds, but this behavior also can lead to lower rates of return;
so, while risk averseness may help with repayment of the loan, it may limit the
benefits from the loan.37
The last reason microcredit institutions have targeted women borrowers
as their preferred clients is probably the most important: loans to women have
a higher impact on poor families. Women’s economic activities in the
economy, such as women’s agricultural crops, do not receive adequate
investment from men; so loans to women end up benefiting women’s sectors
of the economy. As noted above, these neglected women’s sectors and
enterprises may earn a greater return, which means that the loans will have a
greater impact on family income.38
Additionally, research has shown that loans to women have a higher
impact on poor families because women have a different spending pattern than
men. Increases in women’s income results in larger household expenditures
on both food and non-food items than similar increases in income to men, and
women spend more income on the health and education of children in the
household.  Men, in other words, tend to spend more of the increased income39
on themselves than on the household.  This controversial finding of a gender40
specific pattern of spending with women spending more of their earnings on
the family has been reported for a wide variety of countries and societies over
the last twenty years of research on household resources. Muhammad Yunus,
for instance, reports that women spent increased income on children and the
household while men spent more on themselves, a differential spending
pattern he cites as one of the reasons the Grameen Bank targeted women as
customers for microcredit.  Jodi Jacobson, in a summary article on gender41
bias in development, explains that raising men’s income is incorrectly
assumed to benefit the whole family.  She cites studies indicating that women42
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have primary responsibility for family welfare and contribute all of their
earnings to the household while men spend some of their additional income
on “alcohol, tobacco, or other consumer products.”43
The large-scale study of poor people conducted by Deepa Narayan at the
World Bank in the late 1990’s, Voices of the Poor, confirms that women spend
more of their income on family welfare.  In the study, the poor talk about the44
deterioration of income and the emergence of women as family breadwinners
as a natural, necessary response to their economic condition. The study
emphasizes that women will do whatever is necessary to ensure their family’s
survival. From one of the studies in India comes this quote: “[w]hile men are
likely to spend a significant portion of their income for personal use (for
instance, smoking, drinking, gambling), the women in the survey villages
tended to devote virtually all of their income to the family (for food, medical
treatment, school fees and clothing for the children).”45
Increased income for women also results in better health for women and
in higher use of contraceptives. Yunus claims that Grameen Bank families use
family planning at twice the average rate in Bangladesh.  Other evaluations46
are more cautious because the causation may run the other way: women who
are more likely to use contraceptives may also be more likely to borrow from
microcredit organizations. However, Patrick Develtere and An Huybrechts
review the studies on the impact of microcredit on the Bangladeshi poor and
concur that women members of microcredit institutions are more likely to use
contraceptives.  Nathanael Goldberg also reviews the studies on the impact47
of microcredit and concludes that while borrowers were more likely to have
prior use of contraceptives, they still had an increased level of use when
compared to a non-borrowers group of women.  Armendáriz and Morduch48
conclude that microcredit has been a force that has encouraged the decline in
fertility and female illiteracy rates, and they use statistics from three countries
that have extensive microcredit penetration—Bangladesh, Bolivia, and
Indonesia—to show the rapid decline of fertility rates over a thirty-year period
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from 1970 to 2000.  Bangladesh, in particular, is often cited as an example49
of rapid fertility decline from a fertility rate of 7.0 average number of births
per woman in 1970 to 3.1 in 2000 even though it was still a very poor country
in 2000.50
Along with increasing women’s income, micro loans are credited with
empowering women by giving them more influence in decision-making in the
household, the community, and the greater society. Microcredit improves
women’s bargaining power in the household because women now have access
to something that is desirable to the household and because the loan program
changes a woman’s position in the household. Poverty is material deprivation,
but it is also a lack of power or control.  In the World Bank study, Voices of51
the Poor, the individuals interviewed often mentioned humiliation and
dependency.  They saw their poverty as a stigma and felt a lack of self-52
respect and dignity. Amartya Sen in the chapter on women from his classic
work, Development as Freedom, claims that promoting women’s “agency” is
as important as improving women’s “well-being.”  Agency means that53
women are active participants in decisions about their lives rather than passive
targets of policies or programs. Feminist scholars claim that women should be
more than the beneficiaries or targets of economic development programs.54
These scholars claim that women need to be included in the decision-making
process for programs that promote economic development.  If women are55
present at the table when decisions are being made, programs, including the
goals as well as the process, may well turn out differently.56
Microcredit is a development policy that trusts poor people to make
decisions about their own lives. The fact that women are the primary
beneficiaries of these organizations does, in fact, make microcredit different
from other pro-poor development policies. Women as borrowers are able to
increase their own well-being, improve the lives of their children and the
wider household, participate more fully in family and community decision-
making, and gain more control over their lives. While microcredit programs
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were not targeted at women initially, now programs often are available only
for women borrowers.
WHY WOMEN MATTER
The Microcredit Summit Campaign reports that at the end of 2007 over
3,500 microfinance institutions made loans to 100 million of the world’s
poorest families and over 80% of the borrowers were women clients.  The57
Campaign also indicates the areas of the world with the most microcredit
coverage: access exists for 78% of poor families in Asia, but only for 24% of
poor families in Latin America and for 13% of poor families in Africa and the
Middle East.  Microcredit institutions have been remarkably successful in58
implementing access to financial services for the poor and in demonstrating
that these services are viable both for the poor and for the financial institution.
The poor are able to use the loans and repay them with interest. The loans are
used for consumption and to deal with financial emergencies, but primarily
they are used to increase economic production. The poor clients are able to
pay back the loans with a high enough interest rate to make the transactions
sustainable and even profitable for the microcredit institution.
This review of the literature demonstrates that women are the key reason
why microcredit works and why microcredit is beneficial. Women, through
their high repayment rates, prove that poor clients can benefit from credit and
repay the loans. Women work in the types of small enterprise that can grow
with small amounts of additional capital, and they are willing to participate in
a loan structure that improves repayment. In fact, the methodology of
microcredit loans has evolved with the needs and situations of its women
borrowers. Women borrowers also increase the benefits from microcredit.
Microcredit increases the economic well-being of its borrowers, women and
men; however, when women borrow, their increased income improves the
education and health of their children, which transfers benefits to the next
generation. Moreover, microcredit seems to provide an additional push to
lowering fertility rates and to increasing literacy rates in poor countries. In
addition to improved well-being, much of the research on microcredit
attributes to it the empowerment of women, who gain a larger role in
household and community decision-making when microcredit is available.
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Microcredit with women as the principal borrowers is a powerful tool in the
reduction of poverty and the transformation of society.
